Public discourse and political debate increasingly reference polarisation — not as a possibility, but as something that has very much arrived in UK society.

Recent polling by Ipsos found that four in five British adults perceive the UK as divided, with over half (55%) believing that divisions in political views are now so severe they pose a danger to society (Ipsos, 2025). According to King’s College London (2025a), “Perceptions of division in the UK have reached their highest point since trends began in 2020”.

But the key word here is perceived. Are we actually as polarised as we believe ourselves to be? And why does this question matter?

What exactly is polarisation?

According to the Cambridge Dictionary (2026), polarisation is “the act of dividing something, especially something that contains different people or opinions, into two completely opposing groups.” Not all disagreement meets this bar; disagreement is a normal — and healthy — part of democratic politics.

It is helpful to distinguish between two forms of polarisation: issue polarisation and affective polarisation.

Issue polarisation refers to deep division around a specific issue, where positions harden into opposing camps with little shared ground or willingness to compromise, but is often limited to particular topics.

Affective polarisation is broader and more concerning. It describes a situation in which people begin to view those on the ‘other side’ not simply as opponents on one issue, but as fundamentally different, untrustworthy, or morally inferior. This suppresses trust, encourages stereotyping, and discourages engagement. The United States is a clear example, where partisanship shapes political views and identities.

So, is this where the UK finds itself?

How polarised is the UK?

Issue polarisation

Let’s start with issue polarisation and three themes that regularly feature in public discourse. Looking at these examples, we do find disagreement and sometimes heated debate. However, the available data also suggests that the UK is often less fundamentally divided on major issues than public debate implies.

First, consider women’s rights and gender equality. Research by King’s College London (2025b) found that 71% of respondents believe women should be better represented, compared to just 17% who disagree — showing broad agreement that gender equality matters.

Disagreement becomes more visible when people assess how much progress has been made. A YouGov poll (Abraham, 2025) asked whether more or less should be done across a range of gender‑equality domains, including economic opportunity, and leadership. Across most areas, the most common response was that more should be done, often followed by the view that the balance is about right, together forming over 80% of answers. Suggests friction over pace, not the principle of equality.

Climate change presents a similar picture. Overall agreement that climate change is real remains high. Analysis by the NatCen (Morton, 2025) shows denial is confined to a minority, even among supporters of more sceptical parties. Disagreement sharpens around solutions: broad support for offshore wind, more mixed views on nuclear. Here, too, disagreement focuses more on how to respond than on whether the issue itself matters.

Immigration is often described as the UK’s most polarising issue. Yet here again, the data complicates that narrative. Yet NatCen (Easton, 2025) found half of respondents agreed that immigrants are good for the economy, while fewer than a quarter disagreed. More than half rejected the idea that immigrants take jobs from British workers. These figures have reversed since a decade ago, showing a long-term shift to more positive attitudes. Disagreement remains, but it is difficult to characterise public opinion as neatly split into two opposing camps.

Taken together, these examples suggest that while the UK certainly experiences disagreement on important issues, this disagreement often takes place within shared frames of concern. What is contested is frequently the extent of progress or the preferred policy response, rather than the legitimacy of the issue itself. This chimes with a book (Mau et al., 2023) recently published about Germany’s level polarisation, concluding that overall people agree on many aspects and hold similar values, but certain very specific issues trigger heated and hardened debate.

Affective polarisation

Affective polarisation, by contrast, refers to a more entrenched divide between groups. As noted above, the United States provides a prominent example, with growing hostility between political camps. The UK appears different from the US. Party support is more fragmented rather than concentrated in two blocs. As Professor Bobby Duffy (Wright, 2024) notes, UK polarisation is “nothing compared to […] the United States.”

That said, there are dynamics within UK society that risk deepening affective divides. Referendums, by their nature, sort people into binary camps and have played a significant role in recent years. Both the Brexit referendum (Wright, 2024) and the Scottish independence referendum encouraged us‑versus‑them thinking that extended beyond the issues themselves and shaped identities, party affiliation, and voting behaviour. As Ozdemir (Wright, 2024) argues, affective polarisation in the UK has become more pronounced over time, with opinion‑based divisions feeding emotional hostility between groups.

There are also indications of emerging us‑versus‑them narratives around certain parties and issues, notably Reform UK and debates on immigration/crime. While this does not amount to a fully polarised society, it highlights how targeted narratives can contribute to group‑based antagonism.

Overall, then, we can say that while the UK shows signs of affective polarisation, it is far from being a society split into two clearly opposed camps that are hostile to one another across all issues.

Why do we perceive ourselves as polarised?

If the reality is more nuanced, why do so many people feel that the UK is deeply divided?

One explanation is that we are not so much polarised as disillusioned. More in Common’s (2025) report ‘Shattered Britain’, for example, finds that “Seven in ten Britons say that the country is on the wrong track and many are starting to conclude that the problems with our country lie not in one party or political leader, but with the system itself.” Public debate often rewards certainty and outrage over reflection and shared understanding. In a context shaped by uncertainty and fear, empathetic and nuanced discussion becomes harder, making disagreement appear deeper and more entrenched than it may actually be.

A second factor is the role of (social) media. In an attention‑driven economy, polarising content travels faster than careful analysis. Media narratives frequently emphasise conflict and disagreement, reinforcing perceptions of division and encouraging emotional reactions over thoughtful engagement.

Thirdly, the narrative of a polarised society can be politically useful (Mance, 2025). Us‑versus‑them framing has long been a feature of political campaigning, but it has become particularly potent in an age of social media and global uncertainty. Casting society as deeply divided can mobilise supporters, but it can also entrench perceptions of irreconcilable difference.

Why does this matter?

Even if polarisation is largely perceived, it still shapes how we act, who we engage with, and who we to avoid.

When we view society as split into opposing camps, we may disengage from people we disagree with, assuming they are unreasonable or fundamentally opposed to our values. As these divisions become tied to identity, disagreement can feel personal, leading to defensiveness and withdrawal rather than dialogue. Acting from a place of fear or perceived threat, rather than curiosity or shared concern, makes constructive debate harder and can deepen the very divisions we believe already exist.

Understanding the difference between disagreement, issue polarisation and affective polarisation therefore matters. Not because division is absent, but because overstating it risks becoming a self‑fulfilling prophecy.

Bibliography

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